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One of the first lessons we are taught is that it's not a good idea
to touch something if we don't know where it's been. This funda-
mental lesson protects us from the time we are children, and while
we remain inexperienced or vulnerable members of society, un-
knowingly at risk of endangering ourselves. When we are adults,
however, most of us appear to forget this sensible precept entirely,
and to violate it every day. We swallow pills and capsules filled
with mysterious substances, we cover our bodies with clothing and
accessories we find hanging in retail stores, and we fill our homes
with products that were manufactured far away in conditions ut-
terly unknown to us. The extraordinary boldness of American
consumers to put the unknown into, onto, and around their bodies
springs from their confidence in the responsibility of manufactur-
ers. That confidence is buttressed by the belief that government
agencies like the FDA and the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion are actively working as watchdogs to insure that manufactur-
ers live up to their responsibility. The consuming public relies
upon manufacturers to take pains to ascertain that their products
are not defective or unduly harmful when properly used. If a
product were unusually or unexpectedly dangerous, people would
depend upon a manufacturer to have the decency to alert potential
buyers of the risk. American consumers draw their confidence
from the conviction that manufacturers, like caring parents, are
considerate of their customers' welfare. Each purchase an Ameri-
can consumer makes is nothing short of a leap of blind faith in the
manufacturer and the governmental agencies who they trust to
insure that the manufacturers are living up to their responsibili-
ties. Recent events, particularly with respect to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry and the FDA, raise serious doubts as to whether that
blind trust is uniformly justified.
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II. INADEQUACIES OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
One mission of the federal government is to promote consumer
welfare and responsible manufacturing through laws and regula-
tory bodies. The Food and Drug Administration (hereinafter
"FDA"), empowered by various Congressional acts, oversees the
practices of the industries that produce and sell food, medicines,
cosmetics, and therapeutic devices. The FDA can set standards
for product quality and ingredients, require that new types of
products be proven safe before they are marketed, demand that
labeling and advertising be clear and truthful, and enforce the
recall of hazardous products. Other government bodies, such as
the Federal Trade Commission and the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, perform similar duties with regard to different types
of goods
Unfortunately, government agencies like the FDA may fall un-
der the influence of the very industries they are supposed to regu-
late, as well as under the sway of the political agendas of the Ad-
ministration in power. During the first term of George W. Bush,
the reputation of the FDA as an agency that insures the health
and safety of America was repeatedly called into question.2
During the November 18, 2004 Senate Finance Committee
Hearings concerning the pain relieving drug Vioxx, the consumer
protection problems within the FDA were exposed. The hearings
featured alarming testimony from Doctor David Graham, the As-
sociate Director for Science and Medicine in the FDA's Office of
Drug Safety. According to Doctor Graham, the FDA is "broken,"
and "as currently configured is incapable of protecting America
against another Vioxx. We are virtually defenseless."3 Doctor
Graham explained that a conflict of interest exists within the FDA
because the officials responsible for approving new drugs have the
ultimate say as to whether those drugs will be removed from the
market.4 Graham recounted for Congress how senior FDA man-
agement continually pressured him to actually change his scien-
1. U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Milestones in U.S. Food and Drug Law His-
tory, available at http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/miles.html (last visited Sep-
tember 2, 2004).
2. See, Phil B. Fontanarosa, Drummond Rennie,Catherine D. DeAngelis, Postmarket-
ing Surveillance-Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 JAMA 2647-48 (2004) [hereinafter
"Surveillance").
3. United States Senate Hearing on Vioxx, November 18, 2004 [hereinafter "Hear-




tific conclusions and recommendations about the public health
threat posed by dangerous drugs.'
The Journal of the American Medical Association agreed with
Dr Graham, arguing that "[iut is unreasonable to expect that the
same agency that was responsible for approval of drug licensing
and labeling would also be committed to actively seek evidence to
prove itself wrong (i.e., that the decision to approve the product
was subsequently shown to be incorrect.)."' The prestigious medi-
cal journal characterized the FDA's post market approval surveil-
lance system as an "under funded, understaffed, and haphazard
system whereby post marketing information on drug safety and
adverse events is gathered, despite marketed drugs causing thou-
sands of deaths each year."7
During the Senate hearings Doctor Graham explained that Vi-
oxx is a prime example of the national tragedy that occurs when
the FDA and the manufacturer are not doing their job to protect
the American public. According to Graham, Vioxx "may be the
single greatest drug safety catastrophe in the history of this coun-
try" that "largely could have been avoided but wasn't."' Doctor
Graham estimated that 88,000 to 139,000 Americans were injured
by Vioxx, 30% to 40 % of whom probably died.9 In pointing out the
magnitude of the loss of life, Graham explained that this "would
be the rough equivalent of 500 to 900 aircraft dropping from the
sky." ° Prominent members of the medical community agreed with
Graham that countless deaths and much suffering could have
been avoided had Vioxx been recalled when it should have been,
more than four years before it actually was." An editorial appear-
ing in the prominent medical journal The Lancet commented that
both "Merck and the FDA acted out of ruthless, short-sighted, and
irresponsible self-interest."2
5. Id.
6. See, Surveillance, supra note 2, at 2647-48.
7. Id.
8. See, Hearings, supra note 4 (testimony of Dr. David Graham).
9. Id. See also Memorandum from David J. Graham, M.D., M.P.H., Associate Director
for Science, Office of Drug Safety to Paul Seligman, M.D., M.P.H., Acting Director, Office of
Drug Safety, Risk of Acute Myocardial Infarction and Sudden Cardiac Death in Patients
Treated with COX-2 Selective and Non-Selective NSAIDs, (2004).
10. Id.
11. Peter Jini, Linda Nartey, Stephan Reichenbach, Rebekka Sterchi, Paul A. Dieppe,
Matthias Egger, Risk of Cardiovascular Events and Rofecoxib: Cumulative Meta-analysis,
(November 2004) available at http://image.thelancet.com/.




The media that had the opportunity to review confidential in-
ternal Merck documents agreed. Shortly after Vioxx was recalled
from the market, a Wall Street Journal expos6 provided insight as
to what transpired inside Merck. According to the Wall Street
Journal, "internal Merck e-mails and marketing materials as well
as interviews with outside scientists, show that the company
fought forcefully for years to keep safety concerns from destroying
the drug's commercial prospects."3 The New York Times similarly
concluded that "a detailed reconstruction of Merck's handling of
Vioxx, based on interviews and internal company documents, sug-
gests that actions the company took - and did not take - soon after
the drug's safety was questioned may have affected the health of
potentially thousands of patients, as well as the company's finan-
cial health and reputation."" Even one the most highly respected
medical journals in the United States concluded that "a recent
investigation suggests that Merck was well aware of the dangers
of rofecoxib [Vioxx] but made concerted efforts to conceal those
findings."15
Was Vioxx an isolated problem within the FDA? No, not ex-
actly. Vioxx was the ninth prescription drug to be forced off the
market because of death and injury in the last seven years. The
summer before the Vioxx debacle occured, it was revealed that an
unknown but large number of teenage suicides had occurred as a
result of taking certain anti-depressants. It was again revealed
that officials inside the FDA were responsible for the delay in
communicating that information to the public. Dr. Andrew
Mosholder, like Dr. Graham, worked as a reviewer at the Office of
Drug Safety, and concluded that depressed children should not be
prescribed most antidepressants because those medications have
failed to show any beneficial effects against depression and may
cause some to become suicidal. The Office of New Drugs and the
Office of Drug Safety management together suppressed Dr.
Mosholder's report, and prevented him from presenting his find-
ings at an FDA advisory committee meeting. 6 In subsequent Con-
13. Anna W. Mathews and Barbara Martinez, E-mails Suggest that Merck Knew of
Vioxx's Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2004, at Al.
14. Alex Berensen et al., Dangerous Data - Retracing a Medical Trial; Despite Warn-
ings, Drug Giant Took Long Path to Vioxx Recall, N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 2004 §11 (Business
Day) at 1.
15. See, Surveillance, supra note 2, at 2647-48.
16. See, Hearings, supra note 4 (testimony of Dr. David Graham). See also Shankar
Vedantam, WASH. POST, Sep. 10, 2004 at A02.
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gressional hearings, it was revealed that the FDA actually had
prevented the companies from revealing negative studies in drug
labels, and, in one case, "reversed a manufacturer's decision to
amend its drug label to say that the drug was associated in stud-
ies with increased hostility and suicidal thinking among chil-
dren."17 Drug manufacturer Glaxo Smith Kline PLC was subse-
quently sued by New York State Attorney General Eliot L.
Spitzer, who alleged that Glaxo misled consumers and committed
fraud by suppressing clinical studies that raised doubts about the
safety and effectiveness of its top-selling antidepressant Paxil
when used to treat children and adolescents.18 The Journal of the
American Medical Association was also highly critical of the
FDA's handling of the cholesterol-lowering drug Baycol. In this
regard, the Journal concluded that the FDA failed to take
appropriate steps to monitor the Baycol, resulting in numerous
injuries. 9
So what has the FDA done in response to revelelations of this
kind? Do the FDA and the Bush Administration support compen-
sation for the wrongfully injured in light of this kind of evidence?
On the contrary, the Administration unleashed its lawyers to
travel the country to urge judges that the cases of those devas-
tated by injury and mortality should be dismissed. The lawyers
argue the rights of these families should be extinguished because
the FDA approved the drugs and labeling.2"
III. FURTHER WEAKNESSES OF THE FDA
Is the problem within the FDA limited to drug safety? The evi-
dence is to the contrary. In their expos6 of industry practices,
Trust Us, We're Experts!, Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber de-
scribe the relationship between the FDA and Monsanto, a corpora-
tion specializing in agricultural applications of biotechnology and
17. Vedentam, supra note 16.
18. Brook A. Masters, N.Y. Sues Paxil Maker Over Studies On Children ,Negative Data
Withheld, Attorney General Says, WASH. POST, June 3, 2004 at E01. See also Surveillance,
supra note 2, at 2647.
19. Alan Zarembo, The Nation; Report: Bayer Held Back on Drug Dangers; Analysis of
Cholesterol Medication Baycol, which was Pulled in 2001, say Problems Were Indicated as
Early as 1998 FDA is Criticized, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004 at A12. See also Bruce M. Psaty
et al., Potential for Conflict of Interest in the Evaluation of Suspected Adverse Drug Reac-
tions, Use of Cerivastatin and Risk of Rhabdomyolysis, 292 JAMA 2622 (2004).
20. See, Troy (Chief Counsel to FDA), FDA Involvement in Product liability Lawsuits,
at http'//www.fdli.org, (last visited Feb.2003).
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genetic engineering, and a supporter of Genetically Modified
(hereinafter "GM") agricultural and food products.
On the eve of the widespread appearance of GM foods in super-
markets in the early 1990's, Monsanto successfully lobbied the
FDA to declare that GM foods are "substantially equivalent to
conventional foods," thereby automatically qualifying GM foods for
"GRAS," or "generally regarded as safe" status. As a result, in the
eyes of the FDA, a genetically engineered tomato is no different
than an un-engineered tomato, so GM foods require no special la-
beling or safety tests.21 This blanket approval allows for GM foods
to be sold along side of, and even mixed in with, non-engineered
versions of the same foods without so much as a label to allow con-
sumers to distinguish between the two.22
Any reasonable consumer would want to make an informed pur-
chase when it comes to food; but, in the case of GM foods, they are
not able to do so. The FDA has forced consumers to purchase and
eat genetically modified products unwittingly, when many people
might have chosen not to do so had they known what they were
biting into.2" Rampton and Stauber report that "[a] 1999 industry-
sponsored opinion poll found that 62 percent of Americans were
still unaware that GM foods were already widely marketed," while
by that year "about a third of the U.S. corn crop and more than
half of the soybeans planted were estimated to be genetically en-
gineered varieties."24 The agriculture industry was supplying
Americans with a completely new breed of food on a massive scale,
and the government had permitted them to do so without letting
consumers in on the change that had occurred in their own diets.
The FDA's handling of GM food products is an indication of how
government regulatory bodies can be egregiously negligent of con-
sumer's concerns. In exempting GM foods from special labeling
and safety testing, the FDA took from American consumers of
their freedom to choose whether or not to buy GM products. At
the same time, the FDA failed to pressure Monsanto and other
GM industries to make doubly sure that their new technology was
safe before selling its fruits to unsuspecting consumers. In this
case, the FDA, rather than performing its duties of protecting and
informing consumers, was complicit in Monsanto's efforts to keep
21. Sheldon Rampton and John Stauber, Trust Us, We're Experts!, 169-70, (Putnam,
New York 2001).





consumers in the dark as to the origin of and potential risks asso-
ciated with their food.
The FDA's failure in the case of GM foods might be explained by
the powerful means of influencing the government that are avail-
able to manufacturing corporations and industries. Monsanto
"makes large donations to both the Democratic and Republican
parties and to congressional legislators on food-safety committees,
[according to] the Toronto Globe and Mail."25 The ability of corpo-
rations to contribute large sums to the campaigns of key legisla-
tors and to offer comfortable post-public service employment op-
portunities to friendly government officials can be strong tools for
influencing public policy. Disturbingly, Michael Taylor, one of the
FDA officials who formulated the FDA's stance on GM foods, was
a former attorney for Monsanto, who, some time after he had
helped the FDA adopt its Monsanto-friendly policy, left the gov-
ernment and ultimately returned to the employ of the biotechnol-
ogy giant."
Lobbying firms are another tool of influence on the government
at the disposal of corporations. These organizations employ vari-
ous strategies to affect public policy, or, as the website for lobbying
firm Stateside Associates puts it, perform "issue management."
One technique mentioned on the website is the creation of grass-
roots support for a client's agenda by "educating" different target
groups of citizens and "mobilizing" them to contact the govern-
ment in support of the client's position. Another method practiced
by Stateside is to "develop 'champions,'" including politicians,
businesspeople, and "community influentials" who will advocate
that the federal government take action favorable to the lobbying
firm's client. 7 Lobbying firms give corporations the crucial oppor-
tunity to cultivate friendly political contacts who will bear the cor-
poration's interests in mind when it comes time to regulate indus-
try. In addition, the grassroots strategy allows corporations to
create and organize the appearance of independent public support
for their own private agendas. These lobbyist-generated shows of
popular enthusiasm for industries' agendas may help convince
lawmakers that, to please the people, they must adopt the policies
that just happen to please industry. As these are just a few of the
25. Id. at 181.
26. See, Rampton, et al. at 170.
27. Stateside Associates, Issue Management Services, Grassroots / Grasstops available
at http://www.stateside.com/manaaement/grassroots.shtml (last visited Aug. 2, 2004).
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powerful tactics of lobbying firms, it is no surprise that in 2003,
for example, the pharmaceutical industry earmarked $4.9 million
to lobby the FDA.8
The average consumer who is injured by a defective product has
neither the financial resources nor the political connections to be
able to match the kind of influence that industries can have over
governmental regulatory bodies such as the FDA. Government
bodies can grow so comfortable interacting with the manufactur-
ers who are applying to them for product approval that a routine
pattern of relations between the two begins to form. When the
FDA starts to view the manufacturers as partners, rather than
applicants, in the product approval process, regulators may come
to be less critical in accepting the advice, studies, and outlooks
with which industry provides them.29 The danger of such a close
industry-government relationship developing is inherent in the
nature of government regulation. It is relatively simple for the
FDA to communicate with an individual company about its prod-
uct, while it is logistically impossible for the FDA to devote equal
consideration to the multitude of individual consumers with prod-
uct complaints and concerns. The government has a better chance
to make direct contact with a company than it does with a con-
sumer, and where there is contact, there is consideration. The
result of the closeness which can develop between the government
and industry is that the government becomes alienated from the
public it is supposed to protect, and is transformed into little more
than a rubber stamp for industry interests.
Though government bodies like the FDA continue to defend the
safety of American consumers in a multitude of vital ways, the
potential for these groups to become overly compliant with, or
tools of, the interests of industry is alarming. When an industry
has a problem with a government regulation, it has a potent arse-
nal for influencing the government. Including lobbyists, monetary
contributions, and political friends in high places, which can afford
industry direct access to decision makers of a kind that the aver-
age individual cannot hope for. Where a corporation might call on
one of its old executives now working for the government to put in
a good word for them, the average individual may write a letter to
a Senator and hope it is actually read by someone. Ultimately, the
28. See, Surveillance, supra note 2, at 2647.
29. See, Rampton, et al. supra note 21 at 181-82.
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government alone is not equipped to adequately address the con-
cerns of the individual consumer in all situations.
IV. THE MEDIA AND CONSUMERS
An alternative venue for consumer protection is the media. In-
vestigative journalism and reporting can alert millions of consum-
ers about possible risks associated with products, most impor-
tantly when the manufacturer and the government have failed or
chosen not to do so. However, the line between information and
misinformation in the media is sometimes blurred. Many report-
ers have neither the time nor the desire to research and disclose to
their audiences information about the credibility and backgrounds
of their sources. Thus, we may witness a news story in which an
"expert" laughs off the risks associated with a product, and never
be informed that the expert receives funding from, or is associated
with, the manufacturer of that product. 0 When we read a news-
paper or witness a new broadcast on a certain topic, unless we al-
ready have prior knowledge about the story, we are at the mercy
of the reporter. We know only what the media chooses to allow us
to know; and for many Americans, the media is one of the only
practical means of learning what is going on in the nation. Some
parties, certain industries and manufacturers among them, ac-
tively work toward polluting the media with inaccurate, confusing,
and biased reporting in order to serve their own purposes. When
the media is manipulated in this manner, so is the public that de-
pends upon it for information.
For example, some industries hire public relations firms to pro-
duce Video News Releases (hereinafter "VNRs") for distribution to
news networks. These VNRs are pre-packaged news stories de-
signed to resemble conventional TV news segments. They are
given to networks that can choose to air them in part or in their
entirety during their own news broadcasts. VNRs are little more
than commercials in disguise, ways for companies to tout the sup-
posed benefits of their products in the guise of a news story. For
instance, a drug company might produce and distribute a VNR
about the benefits of a drug they manufacture. Networks often do
nothing to indicate to viewers that the footage they are watching
has been supplied by a private company, so the public receives the
information in a VNR as though it were a story reported by the
30. Id at 194.
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news network, rather than industry-provided material. VNRs of-
fer industry a persuasive and covert means of influencing the pub-
lic. Furthermore, since a VNR is technically not a commercial,
companies can make claims about their product that would never
be legally allowed to appear in a paid advertisement: A drug com-
pany's VNR could contain testimony from a doctor insinuating
that their drug might be effective for treating an ailment when
neither scientific evidence nor the FDA has cleared the drug for
such a use.3
The influence of industry-supported "experts" and press releases
litters the media. Trust Us, We're Experts! quotes a 1980 Colum-
bia Journalism Review study that found that over half the stories
of a Wall Street Journal paper "were based solely on press re-
leases." Often the releases were reprinted "almost verbatim or in
paraphrase," with little additional reporting, and many articles
carried the slug "by a Wall Street Journal Staff Reporter."2
Rampton and Stauber then produce an alarming statement from a
public relations executive, who claims that "most of what you see
on TV is, in effect, a canned PR product. Most of what you read in
the paper and see on television is not news. '
When the media chooses, out of bias or laziness, to act as a
mouthpiece for companies and other organizations, readers and
listeners are rarely, if ever, aware of the true source of the infor-
mation they are presented with. Hiding its own opinions and in-
terests inside the Trojan Horse of the media, industries can infil-
trate and influence the minds of unsuspecting consumers.
V. THE PROBLEM OF THE GULF
Though the above analysis of manufacturers, government regu-
lation, and the media, is cursory, at least one impression comes
through definitively: These bodies alone are not enough to satis-
factorily ensure the safety of the American consumer.
Certainly, a manufacturer can be moral, if it chooses to. The
media can thoroughly investigate and reveal the background of its
sources with an eye out for potential biases, if it chooses to. And
the government can remember to put the interests of the people
before those of business, if it chooses to. It is choice, or the lack of
it on the part of the people, that constitutes the problem. In many
31. Id. at 22-24.
32. Id. at 22-23.
33. Id. at 23.
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cases, the government, media, and corporations tend to determine
their policies toward the public without much direct input from
the members of the public itself. It is as though there exists a
gulf, a gaping canyon that isolates individuals from these entities
that have such power over their daily existences.
The gulf separates the people from the companies that manufac-
ture products for them. These manufacturers sit in board rooms
on their side of the canyon, reading reports on how to maximize
sales and minimize costs, seldom paying a glance across the gulf
at the actual human lives their products can affect. When they do
look out the window to get a glimpse of the public, all they see is
statistics. On the other side, the consumers find the products in
retail stores, delivered there from some far away factory, made by
some faceless corporation. They read the labels, use common
sense, and hope for the best.
Cut off from the people as well, government regulatory bodies
peer across the gulf, barely able to make out the public they are
supposed to protect on the other side. Their vision is obscured by
a haze of political contributions and other, subtler forms of influ-
ence that often becomes too thick for their eyes to penetrate.
When the public cries out, it is too faint to hear, or sometimes it is
in so many conflicting voices at once that no one complaint can be
understood.
Also on the far side of the gulf, seemingly inaccessible and in-
scrutable, are the members of the media and their sources. The
public can hear their reports trumpeting over loud speakers from
the distance, but cannot get close enough to inspect the sources for
themselves. Huddled in confusion, the people have no idea
whether the information poured into their ears is from reasonably
unbiased lips or from some industry-paid mouthpiece. The gulf
separates powerful social institutions such as manufacturers, the
government, and the media from contact with, and therefore re-
sponsibility to, individual persons. Ultimately, where there is no
contact, there can be no consideration.
One of the main factors contributing to this alienation is that
the size of the population of the country fosters an impersonal at-
titude in the institutions that deal with the public at large. In the
eyes of a corporation that serves millions each day, it is possible
for the injury of seven hundred customers to seem "statistically
insignificant."4
34. Andrea Gerlin, How Hot Do You Like It?, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 1994, at Al.
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It is true that certain conscientious and ethical manufacturers,
government officials, and journalists make the effort to remember
and acknowledge the best interests of the individuals on the other
side of the canyon. However, when a manufacturer, government
regulator, or journalist fails to adequately consider the good of the
public, they are often inaccessible to public reproach and repri-
mand. The gap is too wide. How is a single individual who is in-
jured by an unsafe product going to reach a manufacturer, influ-
ence government policy, and spread the truth about what has
happened?
To best preserve the interests of the public, it is clear that more
than the occasional benevolence of a manufacturer, government
regulatory body, or investigative journalist is needed. A person
hurt by a defective product should not have to wait to be lucky
enough to be featured on "Seven on Your Side," or to meet a Sena-
tor or executive at a cocktail party, in order to have his or her
grievances be made known and addressed. There must be a way
for a single wronged person to overstep the chasm between him or
herself and the manufacturer of a dangerous product, to take the
initiative to challenge a corporation as an individual and not a
statistic, to confront the maker of a faulty commodity face to face,
with the facts physically in hand, and to demand that responsibil-
ity be taken -- in a word, to demand justice.
VI. THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he
receives an injury." So wrote Chief Justice John Marshall in his
opinion on the 1803 Supreme Court case of Marbury v. Madison.
The operative party in Justice Marshall's statement is the indi-
vidual. The courtrooms of the American civil justice system are
among the few places in the nation where it is the individual who
has the power to initiate action.
The average consumer is lucky if he or she can make contact in
any way, let alone directly speak with, a person with decision-
making power in a corporation, government body, or the media. It
is normally left to the discretion of these bodies to determine
whose concerns they will hear and consider. But when the lowli-
est individual files a civil suit against a corporation, attention
must be paid. Suddenly the complaints of consumers can not be so
easily brushed aside, and the manufacturer runs the risk of being
fined and punished by the court if it does not somehow address the
Vol. 43230
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consumers' allegations. No matter which party the court decides
in favor of, the consumer wins the victory of compelling a manu-
facture to listen to and to consider his or her concerns. The
mightiest corporation is brought to the ground, and must meet the
consumer at eye level. The civil justice system allows the con-
sumer to demand that personal contact with a manufacturer that
is absent in the world outside the courtroom. When a manufac-
turer is forced to directly confront its accuser before a judge and
jury, the help of PR firms, lobbyists, and government regulators
becomes useless. The manufacturer has no choice but to respect
and respond to the consumer.
The civil justice system makes manufacturers responsible to the
individual, and therefore is a powerful recourse for a citizen
harmed by a defective or dangerous product that has somehow
been allowed to appear on the market.
VII. ENFORCING THE UNWRITTEN LAW
Sometimes government laws and regulations not only fail to
protect consumers, but become tools of the very industries that are
endangering the public. The civil justice system is eminently
equipped to expose manufacturers who manipulate and hide be-
hind the law.
A classic case of the civil justice system acting as a check on
companies that have usurped federal regulations for their own
purposes involves the textile industry's use of flammable fabrics.
In 1953 Congress passed the Flammable Fabrics Act, which man-
dated that fabrics pass a particular flammability test in order to
be declared safe for use in clothing. This test was developed by
the American Association of Textile Chemists and Colorists, a tex-
tile industry association that had been "instrumental in guiding
the government toward drawing up regulations and specifica-
tions."35 It is not surprising that the government would rely on the
textile industry's expert advice in developing such regulations, for
who knows more about textiles than a textile manufacturer?
However, this reliance raises the alarming possibility that the tex-
tile industry might use its influence over the government to en-
courage the adopting of standards more favorable to its own inter-
36ests than to those of consumers.
35. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727, 734 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied, 449




It became clear to at least one manufacturer, the Riegel Textile
Corporation, that the federal standards were woefully inadequate,
and that dangerously flammable products were being cleared for
marketing. The head of research at Riegel once alerted a high
ranking Riegel official that newspaper had passed the federal
flammability test as safe for use in clothing, indicating that the
test was nearly meaningless as an assessment of fabric safety.
Riegel was aware of numerous instances in which flannelette, a
fabric type produced by Riegel that had passed the federal test,
had lead to severe burn injuries in wearers. A memo written in
1956 by a Riegel executive expressed the worry that "we are al-
ways sitting on somewhat of a powder keg as regards our flannel-
ette being so inflammable." 7 Three years after the textile indus-
try association had counseled the government to adopt its flam-
mability test, Riegel knew that the test was allowing unsafe,
harmful fabrics to be marketed to consumers.
Rather than pull the highly flammable flannelette off the mar-
ket or use available chemical treatments to make their flannelette
more flame-retardant, Riegel continued to market the fabric in its
hazardous state, without a warning to consumers.3 ' They were
able to do so because their product was in compliance with federal
standards, and no one had chosen to reveal how faulty those stan-
dards were. Riegel allowed the inadequate federal safety test to
stand, risking the lives of consumers rather than risk a downturn
in sales.
The federal safety regulations had become a shield for Riegel to
use while for over a decade they marketed their highly flammable
flannelette for use in clothing such as children's pajamas. The
government was unaware of the iniquity being committed because
Riegel's practices were camouflaged in legality. Only the consum-
ers who had been victims of the flammability of flannelette were
aware that something was not right with the fabric, that it was
inherently dangerous. The civil justice system empowered these
victims to challenge the safety of Riegel's fabric in a way that the
federal regulations did not. When four year old Lee Ann Gryc was
scarred for life on one fifth of her body due to second and third
degree burns she suffered after her flannelette pajama top set on
fire, her family eventually came to sue Riegel in the 1980 civil case
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 297 N.W.2d at 734.
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of Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp. The family alleged that a fabric
which burned so quickly and at such a high temperature should
not have been used in children's clothing, or at the least should
have carried a warning."
During the trial, Riegel mounted the defense that it could not be
held responsible for Lee Ann's injuries, since their flannelette had
met with federal flammability standards. However, internal com-
pany memos, documents, and testimony that Riegel was forced to
submit to the court revealed the truth about Riegel's conduct, that
Riegel had known for years that their product was dangerous and
that the federal test was inadequate, yet they had continued to
market their flannelette regardless. When asked why they had not
included a flammability warning along with their fabrics, Riegel
argued, in part, that it had feared that a warning would "stigma-
tize" its product in the eyes of consumers, hurting sales. After
these facts had been exposed, the civil court did what the govern-
ment had been unable to do: It held Riegel accountable for its im-
moral and cruel conduct. The jury required that Riegel pay
$750,000 in compensatory damages and $1,000,000 in punitive
damages to Lee Ann Gryc.41
The court not only succeeded in securing justice for the Gryc
family, but also acted in the interest of the safety of consumers in
general. A judge who had presided over the case viewed the sub-
stantial sum of money that Riegel was forced to pay in punitive
damages as a means by which civil courts could check unscrupu-
lous manufacturers who had escaped the notice of the government.
It appeared that Riegel had felt that as long as it superficially
complied with federal standards, it had carte blanche to sell what-
ever dangerous fabrics it wanted that could pass the far-too-
lenient test. Once they had hijacked a congressional act to conceal
their own misconduct, they had assumed that they were untouch-
able, that they could endanger the public with impunity. "A legal
tool is needed," wrote a justice presiding over the case, "that will
help to expose this type of gross misconduct, punish those manu-
facturers guilty of such flagrant misbehavior, and deter all manu-
facturers from acting with similar disregard for the public welfare.
The punitive damages remedy is such a tool."2
40. Id. at 730.
41. Id. at 729.
42. Id. at 732.
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The results of the Gryc case sent a message to manufacturers:
The law itself cannot be used hide misbehavior; the court will al-
ways hold companies responsible for endangering the public when
they knew better, or should have.
The civil justice system is a vital safety net that makes sure
that manufacturers comply not only with the letter of the law, but
also with the unwritten laws of human morality and decency.
Riegel did not need any federal regulation to tell them that mar-
keting a product they knew was too flammable to safely wear was
wrong; no federal regulation could justify such a practice. The
attempted defense employed by the textile company in this case
was reminiscent of the argument made by several ex-Nazi officials
at Nuremberg: that though they had participated in the organiza-
tion of mass murder, they could not be held personally responsible
because their actions had been supported and approved by the
government. On a less dramatic scale, Riegel too had attempted
to deny the personal responsibility it bore for its decisions by cit-
ing government approval; but just as the Nazi officials' own com-
mon sense would have informed them of their government's moral
bankruptcy, Riegel's officials knew of the federal test's inability to
determine fabric safeness. Both parties made a conscious decision
to do the wrong thing, and both were made to answer to the court.
Only a civil trial could penetrate Riegel's faqade of technical legal-
ity, expose the stark immorality behind their actions, and commu-
nicate that Riegel, and all offenders of a similar sort, will be met
with severe chastisement.
VIII. AN UNMEDIATED VIEW
One might think that a body that empowers the average indi-
vidual against the forces of injustice would be the subject of public
reverence, respect, and appreciation, but such is hardly true for
the civil justice system. By and large, the popular representation
of the court is an unfavorable one. A composite of the various
negative public conceptions of the civil court would portray it
thusly: a corrupt, imbecilic body before which greedy, equivocat-
ing, ambulance-chasing lawyers bring baseless, trifling cases and
win multimillion dollar settlements from suing corporations with
deep pockets for any frivolous reason they can dream up. The
internet, airwaves, and legislatures of America abound with cries
for the limiting of "lawsuit abuse," and for "tort reform."
Of course, the civil justice system and the lawyers who argue be-
fore it are not perfect, but neither is any other body or profession.
Vol. 43234
Consumer Protection
Why then, are the members of the civil justice system, and trial
lawyers in particular, singled out as more likely to be duplicitous
than members of any other profession?
Perhaps lawyers are slapped with the epithet "liar" not because
of any genetic or professional disposition to falsify, but because
every argument they make, and every conflict in which they par-
ticipate in the resolution of, is by definition disputable. Fre-
quently, when someone reads about a case in the newspaper and
dismisses it as frivolous, they do not so much possess any informa-
tion proving that the case is without merit, but merely disagree
with the attorney's and the court's interpretation of the available
information.
Part of the beauty of the civil justice system is that every case
involves several different ways to view a situation, and that both
parties are given a fair chance to argue for the fitness of their own
interpretation. It is essential that cases that seem frivolous at
first glance, but have the tiniest reasonable possibility of merit, be
argued before the court. Many opinions that we today consider
fundamental pillars of society were once decried as fallacies.
There was likely a time when the majority of Americans would
have considered Brown v. The Board of Education to be a frivolous
case. Ultimately, society is enriched and enlightened by the
court's critical process of considering all reasonable outlooks,
rather than dismissing unlikely but possible arguments off hand.
Those who bemoan the presence of supposedly frivolous cases in
the civil justice system are actually subscribing the very principal
of disputability upon which the court is founded. Their disagree-
ment exemplifies the clashing of informed points of view that is
meant to occur in the court room, and to lead to a better under-
standing of the truth. The key word of the previous sentence is
"informed." In the course of everyday life, the average citizen has
no source but the media for information about the world outside of
his or her personal existence. Most citizens do not have the time
to research and check the information communicated to them via
the media, and therefore must either believe what they are told, or
resign themselves to uncertainty. This dilemma often leaves the
public vulnerable to adopting incomplete, inaccurate, and biased
reports from the media as the truth. Its dependence on the media
often renders the public ill-equipped to form informed opinions
about many issues, including the merits of civil court cases.
The way in which a juror learns about the parties involved in a
civil suit is the opposite of the way in which the average American
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learns about the outside world. In everyday life, the information
Americans receive tends to come from the media, but the informa-
tion a jury receives is unmediated; it comes directly from the
sources, to whom the court has uninhibited access. The people
making statements in a trial are held personally accountable in a
way that people making statements for the media are not -- there
is no distance between speaker and audience, no buffer between
making a claim and being held responsible for making it.
It is in the courtroom, more than in any other place, that the
facts of a case become most accessible to the people who must
make a decision based upon them. Manufacturers are made to
produce internal documents, memos, letters, and test results that
never would appear in their official press releases. Witnesses and
experts must give testimony under oath, before the scrutiny of
judges and attorneys, with jurors looking into their eyes. Public
relations techniques and biased news reporting, tools often em-
ployed by manufacturers to misinform and mislead the public,
cannot be used to sway a jury. Within the walls of a courtroom,
many of the distractions are stripped away that, in the outside
world, prevent the full truth from being readily and directly ex-
posed to public knowledge.
The sources of information are at the beck and call of the court;
they are at the disposal and service of the people who need to
learn the truth from them, rather than in the control of any pri-
vate interest.
IX. THE COMPARATIVE ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE JURY
When Stella Liebeck successfully sued the McDonald's Corpora-
tion in 1994 after she received burns from spilling McDonald's cof-
fee on herself, The Wall Street Journal reported that "public opin-
ion [was] squarely on the side of McDonald's."43 The court's find-
ing against McDonald's seemed an outrageous violation of com-
mon sense. Everyone knows that coffee is supposed to be hot, and
one ought to use caution in handling it; if you spill it and burn
yourself, that's unfortunate, but it's your own fault and no one
else's. The jury members, many assumed, must have been mo-
rons.
In actuality, at least three members of the jury expressed that,
before the trial began, they too had felt that the Ms. Liebeck's case
43. See, Gerlin, supra note 34.
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would turn out to be ridiculous. By the end of the trial, though, a
complete transformation had taken place. It took the jury only
four hours to reach a unanimous verdict against McDonald's."
What witchcraft had Ms. Liebeck's lawyers employed to turn a
group of sensible people into a "runaway jury"? What was the dif-
ference between the jury members and the preponderance of the
public, which was so convinced of the frivolity of the case? The
jury had direct exposure to the facts.
Jurors are brought to a state of comparative enlightenment by
their participation in the trial; they learn details first-hand that
they otherwise would probably never have known. One juror re-
marked that the facts presented were "overwhelmingly against
the company." 5 By coming into contact with the facts in a way in
which the most of the media had not chosen to present them, the
jurors gained an insight into the case unavailable to the general
public, and was better equipped to ascertain the true extent of the
wrongdoing, if any, committed by McDonald's.
News articles and oral gossip circulating at the time often
glossed over the specific nature of the burns that Ms. Liebeck had
sustained from the coffee spill, merely noting that she had been
burned.46 When most people think of being burned by spilled cof-
fee, they picture a red patch, perhaps even a blister. During the
trial, the jury learned that Ms. Liebeck had received third degree
burns on her groin, inner thighs, and buttocks, killing the full
thickness of her skin down to the nerves and blood vessels, that
required a week in the hospital, skin grafts, and two years of re-
habilitation and therapy. The jury was also shown pictures of her
injuries.47 No longer could the jury members join with the major-
ity of the public in dismissing Ms. Liebeck's injuries as trifles. She
had been hurt to a degree of seriousness that most people would
not have expected as a result of spilling a cup of coffee.
Another advantage that the jury had over the general public
was that they were able to witness in person the attitude McDon-
ald's took toward Ms. Liebeck and her injuries. One McDonald's
executive testified that although they knew most customers would
44. Ralph L. Brill, Torts, Chicago-Kent College of Law, available at
http://www.kentlaw.edu/classes/rbrill/TORTS-FALL2002/eveningsup-mat/coffee.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2004).
45. See, Gerlin, supra note 34.
46. See, Brill, supra note 44.
47. See, Gerlin, supra note 34. See also, The "Real" Stella's Case, available at
http://www.stellaawards.com/stella.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2004).
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not assume that a spilled cup of coffee could result in such severe
burns, much less skin grafts and years of recuperation, the com-
pany had chosen not to warn consumers about these dangers. In
response to the fact that internal documents from McDonald's con-
firmed that the company received at least 700 burn complaints of
varying severity over a ten year period, McDonald's argued that
700 injuries are "statistically insignificant" compared to the mil-
lions upon millions of cups of coffee sold that did not result in in-
jury. No burn expert had been consulted by the company to ad-
dress the issue, though McDonald's had already had to settle sev-
eral burn complaints by paying the victims, sometimes more than
$500,000. The company appeared distinctly dismissive of both the
danger of their coffee and the individuals it had hurt.49 Nothing
could substitute for being physically present to see McDonald's
acknowledge that they knew of 700 injuries of varying degrees of
similarity to the horrific burns suffered by Stella Liebeck, and yet
brush off the issue, stating that, "there are more serious dangers
in restaurants." 9 The jurors saw McDonald's as few members of
the public would ever be able to see the corporation.
In an argument similar to that employed by the Riegel Textile
Corporation in the Gryc case, McDonald's claimed that it had sim-
ply complied with coffee industry standards that suggested coffee
be held at around 180 to 190 degrees Fahrenheit for the best taste.
When a witness for McDonald's testified that any liquid above 130
degrees Fahrenheit could cause third degree burns, implying that
the specific temperature of McDonald's coffee did not matter, a
witness for Liebeck noted that the hotter the liquid, the quicker
severe injuries are inflicted. Coffee at 190 degrees could cause a
third degree burn in less than three seconds, while coffee at 180
degrees would take 12 to 15 seconds, and at 160 degrees, it would
take about 20 seconds.51 Ms. Liebeck would have had more time to
remove her coffee-soaked clothing, thus reducing the severity of
her burns, had her drink been served at a lower temperature.
When the jury was clearly presented with the facts of the plain-
tiffs case, and was able to size them up next to what they discov-
ered about McDonald's' attitude toward its customers' burn inju-
ries, the decision was relatively simple. The fact that a coffee in-






dustry association says that coffee tastes best at a certain tem-
perature does not necessarily make coffee safe to drink at that
temperature. McDonald's admitted it was fully aware of the dan-
gerous nature of its coffee, and was receiving an average of 70
burn complaints a year, yet had written off these injuries, deciding
neither to warn consumers of the unexpectedly serious burns that
might result, nor to investigate as to why so many people were
being badly hurt by a McDonald's product. It became obvious to
the jury that McDonald's was shirking its responsibility to alert
and protect its customers from a danger that McDonald's itself
knew of, but that many of its customers did not.52
The jury found that Ms. Liebeck bore 20% of the responsibility
for her injuries, as it was she who had spilled the coffee. However,
the rest of the responsibility was found to rest upon McDonald's,
whose active disregard for the safety of its customers led directly
to the fact that the coffee Ms. Liebeck spilled on herself was hot
enough to nearly instantly destroy the skin that it touched. 3 Had
the jury not learned from internal documents of the 700 previous
complaints, and had the jury not heard McDonald's admit that it
knew of the injuries, knew of the danger and of the consumer's
unawareness, but that in the end it didn't attach enough impor-
tance to the issue to do anything about it, perhaps then the jury
could have gone on believing with the rest of the public that the
case was a frivolous joke. But the trial process had exposed the
jury to a truth that the general public is not often allowed to ac-
cess in its unadulterated, unmediated form -- a corporation had
knowingly endangered people for the sake of a more marketable
product.
Only in court could a consumer force a corporation like McDon-
ald's to provide the private, internal information and to answer
the embarrassing questions that would exhibit the extent of their
relative disregard for their individual customers. The civil justice
system, in a way that even a well-researched work of investigative
journalism cannot, brings a manufacturer into sharp focus for the
eyes of the audience, the jury, to inspect. There is no way to be
closer to the subject of an inquiry than to be in the same room, to
hear the words from the source. It is in court, where such first
hand contact occurs, that the most well-informed judgments about
a dispute can be made.
52. Id.
53. See, Gerlin, supra note 34.
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All three of the bodies discussed above, the government, the
media, and the civil justice system, have proven themselves capa-
ble of upholding the interests of the consuming public. However,
only one body, the civil justice system, not only defends but em-
powers the consumer. The people depend on bodies like the media
and the government, just as children depend upon their guardi-
ans, to defend them from defective products and to punish im-
moral manufacturers who would hurt them. The civil justice sys-
tem, on the contrary, allows the individual consumer to take the
safety of the public and the chastisement of industrial wrongdoers
into his or her own hands; the consumer is no longer a child reli-
ant on the advocacy of the government, media, or any other body.
It is only in the context of the civil justice system that the con-
sumer, in his or her own right, can demand the respect and ac-
countability of the most powerful elements of society.
In a nation of millions, in which the average individual is all but
totally isolated from the forces that influence and control daily
life, the civil justice system provides a special environment in
which, truth, accountability, and contact, rather then remoteness,
become realities. Beyond protecting the rights of consumers, the
civil justice system brings to light the known dangers of countless
products, such as the recently produced drugs Vioxx, Baycol, and
Paxil, thereby guarding the physical safety of the public.
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